Why Have Some Monetary Reforms Succeeded and Others Not? - An Empirical Assessment by Andreas Freytag
INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK 
AN DER UNIVERSITÄT ZU KÖLN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why Have Some Monetary Reforms Succeeded and 
Others Not? – An Empirical Assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Andreas Freytag 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IWP Discussion Paper 2001/4 
April 2001 
  
 
Why Have Some Monetary Reforms Succeeded and 
Others Not? – An Empirical Assessment 
 
 
by 
Andreas Freytag* 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Monetary history is characterised by crisis and reform. The paper is 
dedicated to an explanation of what makes monetary reforms successful. A 
cross-sectional econometric analysis is chosen to deal with this problem. It 
is based on a standard macroeconomic model of commitment and 
credibility. As the dependent variable, we calculate a post-reform inflation 
rate. The exogenous variables are the degree of legal commitment and the 
constraining influence of institutions. The paper allows for the conclusion 
that monetary commitment, the consideration of institutional constraints and 
abstinence from the money press are crucial for the success of a monetary 
reform.  
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I. The  Problem 
Although the consciousness for monetary stability has grown in the last 
two decades, many countries still suffer from inflation. The need for 
monetary stabilisation is still prevalent. Venezuela as well as some Eastern 
European countries are currently discussing options for new monetary 
regimes. At the end of the 20
th century, one can look back on approximately 
70 monetary reforms since World War I. Many were successful, some 
failed. An eventual failure reduces the credibility of further efforts to 
stabilise the economy. Thus, to avoid future failures it makes sense to 
analyse past monetary reforms carefully. 
Typically, a monetary reform is necessary after a period of severe 
inflation, sometimes hyperinflation. In most cases, high inflation is caused 
by the inability of the government to cover its expenditure without printing 
money. This causes inflation as well as future inflationary expectations in 
the public. The announcement of a monetary reform may lead to dynamic 
inconsistency if the public does not believe in the announcement. 
Therefore, the success of a monetary reform may depend not only on the 
choice of the right regime, but also on other factors. The hypothesis 
developed here is that the institutional setting in the country or its economic 
order respectively plays a major role. The relationship of monetary 
commitment and institutions is subject to closer scrutiny.  
In the next section, we theoretically explain the incentives of a monetary 
policymaker to inflate after a monetary reform. These considerations form 
the basis for an econometric model to estimate the determinants of success 
and failure of monetary reforms. We introduce the econometric model in 
section III. In section IV, we present the results of a cross-sectional analysis 
using a sample of 29 reforms after World War II. The results are discussed 
in section V. The final section is dedicated to economic policy conclusions. 
 
II. Theoretical  Considerations 
The theoretical analysis begins at a point in time of severe inflation. 
However, we assume that a consensus about the benefits of price level 
stability and the need of disiniflation has been reached within the society.
1 
Methodically, we construct an objective function for the policymaker which 
he seeks to maximise under certain constraints (Barro 1983). These are 
direct costs of inflation and costs of expected inflation. The constraints are 
                                             
1  Végh (1995) shows that consensus can be reached more easily after a hyperinflation 
than after chronic inflation.  Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  3 
 
politically best considered by the government through committing to a 
monetary regime. The choice of monetary policy is in fact the choice of a 
set of rules (Brennan and Buchanan 1981, p. 65). Thus, commitment is 
made by governments rather than by monetary policymakers such as central 
bankers.
2 The main goal of commitment is to diminish inflationary 
expectations. We suppose that the government as well as the public have 
rational expectations. The public uses all information available in period s 
(Is) to form expectations about the rate of inflation in period s+1. 
We assume that the main reason for high inflation was the government’s 
need for revenues (Bernholz 1995, pp. 263f). Other sources of revenues 
such as income tax or value added tax proved insufficient to cover the 
government’s expenditure.
3 Therefore, it seemed attractive for the 
government to increase the money supply. It tried to issue enough money to 
maximise the amount of seigniorage S. 
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The weight the government places on seigniorage in (1) is denoted by δ  
with  0 ≥ δ . We define  )) ( exp(
2 e k π π φ + =  where k(π
e) describes the costs 
of expected inflation. Increasing expected inflation raises the political costs 
associated with inflationary expectations. The government takes the 
expected inflation rate as given. The fact that actual inflation enters the cost 
function in a quadratic form also takes into account the cost of deflation. 
Thus the objective function becomes: 
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2  Cukierman (1992, p. 53) also concludes that this is adequate. See also McCallum 
(1997). 
3  Another motive of the government can be debt reduction which – on the other hand – 
can be incorporated into equation 1. Instead of raising revenues to pay off debt, the 
debt will be reduced via money growth. 
4  Alternatively, a loss function could be minimised.  4 Andreas  Freytag 
 
Equation (2) can be maximised with respect to π . The first-order 
condition is given by  0
!
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Rearranging this condition finally yields: 
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Equation (3) shows that the optimal inflation rate in this setting can only 
be derived implicitly. It can be rearranged to (4) which can be seen as a 
basic equation for an econometric analysis: 
 
(4)   ) ( ) / ln( ln 2 ln
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The theoretically interesting factor in (4) is k(π )
e, reflecting the costs of 
inflationary expectations. These can be increased by a commitment to a 
monetary regime designed to keep inflation low. In case of reneging, the 
commitment has to generate high costs for the policymaker to be credible 
(Barro and Gordon 1983). The costs of commitment can be specified in 
different ways. In the next section, we distinguish three options. 
 
III.  The Econometric Model 
a) Specification of costs of commitment 
In this subsection, the expression k(π
e) is further specified. There are 
three options to think of. In the first specification the costs of inflationary 
expectations are set equal to the degree of legal monetary commitment C. 
 
(5)   C k
e = ) (π . 
 
The variable C is a composed index, restricted between 0 and 1. It 
consists of 10 criteria with 12 components which are described in detail in 
Table A2 of Appendix 1.
5 It is calculated as the unweighted and weighted 
average of these criteria. The unweighted index of commitment Cuw 
attributes the same weight to each of the ten criteria. In contrast, the 
weighted index Cw attributes more weight to the objectives of monetary 
                                             
5  See also Freytag (2001). Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  5 
 
policy, governmental influence, external obligations, convertibility and 
limitations on lending to the government. Less weight is given to 
appointment and dismissal procedures, competitive elements, regulatory 
issues and accountability (Table A1). The index of commitment, thus, 
reflects a monetary regime, such as a central bank system or a currency 
board. The calculation of the index is comparable to the index of central 
bank independence as calculated by Cukierman (1992, p. 381). 
Theoretically, it has a negative impact on inflation. It has to be emphasised 
that C reflects legal commitment. It does not measure the de facto monetary 
regime. 
A legal commitment is ceteris paribus not a sufficient condition for 
success. There might be constraints which do not allow the commitment to 
become credible. To give an example: in a country with perfect unionisation 
and collective bilateral wage negotiations, the government introduces a 
currency board to reduce the annual inflation rate from 200 per cent close to 
zero inflation. Now presume the negotiators do not consider the case of zero 
inflation while bargaining. This will cause unemployment to rise heavily 
unless the government inflates moderately. It then has the choice to follow a 
sustainable monetary policy (with rising unemployment) or to give up the 
currency board (with declining credibility). Taking the labour market 
regime into account from the beginning, would certainly lead to a different 
monetary regime through the reform. 
Consequently, the second specification adds in the institutional setting in 
a country, consisting of formal and informal as well as politically created 
(economic order) and spontaneously evolved institutions. It is modelled as a 
number of institutional factors (IFi) also restricted to values between 0 and 
1 (Appendix 2).
6 We identify six institutional factors:  
•  Political stability (PS) implies that a political system is stable rather 
than long-term survival of a party in government. It is composed of 
three elements: unsuccessful irregular executive transfers (coup 
d’état), successful irregular executive transfers and political reprisals 
in the year of monetary reform. 
•  An indicator of fiscal stability ( FS) should meet two conditions. 
Ideally, it should not be based exclusively on historical performance, 
and it should also be calculable. The indicator is derived from the 
fiscal balance (revenues minus expenditure) of the state which is 
divided by the GDP. 
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•  Labour market flexibility (LM) is ideally measured by an index giving 
evidence of the duration of unemployment and the speed, with which 
structural change is managed on the labour market. A lack of reliable 
data forces us to use an alternative, namely the gross shift between 
sectors in history instead of analysing labour market regimes. We 
thus look at the actual flexibility of the labour force, which may be 
affected by several factors, e.g. the labour market regime, but also 
technological change and the state of development a country is in. 
•  Openness ( OP) of the country is restricted to trade (exports plus 
imports). 
•  Public attitude to inflation (POI) is comprised of past experience and 
actual regulations. The former inflation record is especially relevant 
for a country after a hyperinflation. People are very sensitive as 
regards stability: since they know the cost of inflation on average they 
strongly oppose another hyperinflation. Elements forming the 
measure are past inflationary experience, indexation and price 
freezes. In transition economies, however, the past inflation 
experience may be too little to form a collective memory.  
•  If a fixed exchange rate regime is chosen, it makes sense to also 
consider properties of the reserve currency (RC). It should not only 
be chosen to import stability, but also to protect the reform country 
from external shocks.  
Alternatively to these factors, the index of economic freedom can be 
applied. The measurement of economic freedom is similar to the other 
variables. The index of economic freedom is the average of a number of 
criteria like trade policy regime, tax policy, monetary policy etc. (Gwartney 
and Lawson 1997 and Gwartney, Lawson and Samida 2000). Naturally, to 
be useful for the goal of our analysis, the criteria for monetary policy have 
to be eliminated from both indexes since monetary commitment has already 
been considered. Moreover, it is necessary to avoid statistical interference.  
These institutional factors are explained in detail in Appendix 2. Their 
theoretical impact on inflation is negative, i.e. the higher political stability, 
fiscal stability, labour market flexibility, openness and public opposition to 
inflation are, the lower is the optimal inflation rate for the policymaker. The 
variable  RC needs more description: it is high when the choice of the 
reserve currency is likely to protect the country from exogenous shocks. 
This is given if a high share of foreign trade is either with the reserve 
country itself or with other countries having also fixed their exchange rate Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  7 
 
towards the reserve country (Freytag 1998). The expected sign is negative, 
i.e. high protection from external shocks reduces inflation.  
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The third specification models the relation between commitment and 
institutions by calculating the costs of commitment as a function of the 
difference between the degree of commitment and the average of the 
institutional factors i, all restricted to values between 0 and 1. The costs are 
the higher, the smaller the difference between the level of commitment C 
and the average level of the institutional factors IFi.. In other words: a high 
degree of commitment is likely to stabilise expectations if it is accompanied 
by high political stability, fiscal stability etc. It is less likely so if there are 
huge differences between the degree of legal commitment and the actual 
institutional setting. The quadratic form implies that big differences will 
cause high costs and that all summands are positive. As a result, the costs of 
commitment decrease as compared to its highest possible costs not only if 
the degree of commitment is too low, but also if it is too high. To take them 
into account properly, we specify the costs of commitment as follows: 
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To sum up: the first specification does not allow for a judgement of how 
credible commitment is. The second corrects for institutional factors, but 
the relation between commitment and these factors is not close at all. 
Theoretically most appealing, in the third case k(π
e) is modelled as an ex-
ante proxy for credibility. Credibility itself depends on how good the 
chosen commitment harmonises with the institutional setting in the country. 
The better the degree of commitment suits the institutional setting, the 
higher the credibility of the reform and the lower the inflation rate are.  
b) Other determinants of the success of monetary reform 
Seigniorage. In the theoretical model, the success of the reform also 
hinges on the degree to which the government needs seigniorage (δ ) and on 
the demand for money (M/P). An actual attitude of the government towards 8 Andreas  Freytag 
 
seigniorage  δ , naturally, cannot be observed.
7 Instead, a measure of 
seigniorage itself has to be applied. There is no clear concept of 
seigniorage, the difficulty being to link monetary and fiscal aspects. Klein 
and Neumann (1990) incorporate both aspects and show that the correct 
magnitude of seigniorage transferred to the government cannot be 
determined by a simple formula such as the Cagan-type we implicitly used 
in the theoretical considerations ( ) (
e mL S π = ) (Gagan 1956). The same 
holds for the two concepts of seigniorage which are generally used, the so-
called opportunity cost concept and the monetary seigniorage concept. 
Instead, a correct measure of seigniorage has to consider legal, institutional 
and operational details of money creation (Klein and Neumann 1990). Only 
then the contribution of seigniorage to the public budget in different 
countries can be made fully comparable.  
The demand for real money is defined as  P M L
e e / ) exp( ) ( = − = απ π . 
As we cannot observe  ) (
e απ −  we have to operate with  P / M . However, 
both M and P are already incorporated in other variables. M is part of any 
measure of seigniorage, whereas P  is a component of the endogenous 
variable, the inflation rate. Thus, multicollinearity is very likely to occur. 
Therefore, one remedy is to not include the demand for money. The 
technique of dropping a variable is one possible answer to this problem, but 
not the best since information disappears, if the variable’s estimators differs 
from zero (Kennedy 1992, pp. 180-186). 
An alternative is to form a principal component, i.e. a composite variable 
consisting of the two multicollinear variables (ibid.). In a heuristic way, this 
is done constructing the variable SEIGN. It is calculated as the annual 
increase in base money over the sum of public revenues and the annual 
increase in base money for the same year (see Appendix 2). Thus, it 
comprises the information about the demand for money and the dependence 
on seigniorage. This can be seen when looking at the expected sign of both 
variables. Both the reliance on seigniorage δ  and demand for real money 
(M/P) positively contribute to post-reform inflation (4.11): 
... ln ln ln ... ... ) / ln( ln ... 2 ln
2 + − + = + + = + P M P M δ δ π π . The variable 
SEIGN includes both δ  and M with the theoretically shown direction of 
causation. We add lnP to the left hand side, so that P is included in the 
dependent variable, again having the theoretically expected sign. Next, we 
approximate  Seigniorage M ≈+ ln lnδ  respectively and find that inflation 
positively depends on SEIGN. It is a good approximation and allows to not 
                                             
7  This holds regardless of whether or not the government has committed to a rule that 
abolishes direct loans received from the monetary authority.  Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  9 
 
compose a special variable for the demand for real money. The theoretically 
expected impact of this variable on the success of the reform is negative, 
that is the expected influence on inflation is positive. 
International capital mobility. One factor that may also be important for 
the policymakers’ calculus, is the degree of capital mobility. Capital 
mobility is determined by the legal (national and international) framework 
and by technical opportunities. In recent economic history, increasing 
capital mobility can be observed after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods 
system. During its existence, capital mobility was rather modest, due to 
political and technological obstacles.  
On the one hand, it seems convincing in theory that higher capital 
mobility contributes to lower inflation rate since the capital owners can 
avoid the country with a high inflation rate more easily. If they do so, 
investments are lower than possible, eventually leading to unemployment. 
This provides a strong disincentive for governments to increase the money 
supply above a certain level. Given the relatively low degree of capital 
mobility, one could argue that the inflationary bias during the existence of 
the Bretton-Woods system was stronger than afterwards.  
On the other hand, the Bretton-Woods system had a disciplining effect 
on governments. Many countries had fixed their exchange rate towards the 
US-$. This fixing gave a strong disincentive to raise inflation. But even 
without being part of the system, governments were always reminded of 
monetary discipline. Consequently, the average inflation rate during the era 
of Bretton-Woods was lower than afterwards. Until 1973, average CPI in 
the world was below 10 per cent. From 1974 until 1995 (with the exception 
of 1978) it was on the two-digit level. Additionally, the increasing average 
inflation rate can certainly be traced back to supply shocks, in particular the 
huge price increase of oil in 1973/4 and 1979/80 respectively (IMF (a), 
October 1996, pp. 100f). Only recently, average inflation moved beyond 10 
per cent again. Thus, without the empirical results it remains an open 
question in which way capital mobility affects the politically optimal 
inflation rate. The variable PostBW is a dummy and measures the effect of 
the Bretton-Woods system. Its value equals 1 if the reform was made after 
1973 and 0 if it was made until then. The impact on inflation is theoretically 
ambiguous, as explained above.  
c) Inflation as the dependent variable 
The rate of inflation after the monetary reform is the endogenous variable 
in the model. Policymakers announce a monetary policy, subsequently react 
to certain signals and choose an inflation rate which seems optimal from 10 Andreas  Freytag 
 
their personal perspective. In general, the variables are based on the concept 
of consumer price inflation (CPI). This is the best approximation given the 
goal to break inflationary expectations in the public, and it is an 
internationally comparable indicator. Moreover, the data is available for the 
whole sample. The theoretical model does not allow to separate the rate of 
inflation on the left hand side. Instead, the expression 
2 2 ln π π +  (equation 
9) overemphasises high inflation and huge differences within the sample. 
This makes the estimation even more difficult. Given the diversity of the 
sample, it therefore makes sense to eliminate 
2 and to approximate 
CPI ln 2 ln
2 ≈ + π π . 
Disinflation with the help of a new monetary regime is a process which 
takes its time. It can hardly be expected that the annual inflation rates drops 
down close to zero within a year or even a shorter period. Inflationary 
expectations are very resistant especially when the public has experienced a 
few unsuccessful reforms before. People are accustomed to rising prices. 
Moreover, many contracts may be indexed so that there is an inflationary 
pressure. Even if the monetary reform is credible (C-IF close to zero), the 
stabilisation process will be time consuming. Thus, we assume a period of 
five years as being sufficient for the stabilisation process. It can be expected 
that a success of the reform will be visible within five years. Of course, 
disinflation can be achieved earlier with the inflation rate being low 
afterwards. Moreover, a failure can be identified easily within five years. 
Even if in the first few months or years after the reform a slight stabilisation 
is observed, this period is long enough to recognise a failure. 
Hence, we use two different specifications of the dependent variable.
8 
The first is a weighted average of annual inflation rates during a period of 
five years after the reform (WCPI). The highest weight is given to the final 
year. The second specification is the average inflation rate during this 
period (ACPI). Both are tested in logarithmic form, reflecting the dynamic 
character of a disinflation program. 
 
IV. The  Results 
a) Introduction 
In this section, the theory on the success and failure of monetary reforms 
is tested empirically. The sample consists of 29 monetary reforms after 
World War II (Table A 3). Virtually all were implemented after periods of 
severe inflation. The majority took place in Latin America. We have tried to 
                                             
8  Detailed definitions and explanations are given in Appendix 2. Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  11 
 
avoid a pre-selection bias through the inclusion of a number of reforms 
which could be easily identified as purely cosmetic undertakings designed 
to mislead the public (Mas 1995). In Central and Eastern European 
transition countries, the original changes in the monetary regime during the 
transition process have not been included. Subsequent monetary reforms 
due to failures of these attempts have been considered.  
The method applied is cross-sectional OLS, the computation is carried 
out with EViews 3.1.
9 The OLS estimation can produce ‘good’ econometric 
result in a sense that the estimators are unbiased and have minimum 
variances. Estimators having these properties are called BLUE (best linear 
unbiased estimators). However, the goodness depends crucially on whether 
the model is well specified. Problems may occur regarding the econometric 
model,
10 albeit not all difficulties one might think of, are relevant for this 
study.
  
b) Tests necessary due to the diversity of the sample 
Before we begin with the econometric assessment, we have to consider 
the diversity of the sample. It consists of reforms pursued within three 
continents and over almost 50 years. In addition, average post-reform 
inflation rate varies between 1 per cent and more than 1,300 per cent. First, 
heteroscedasticity, i.e. the fact that the variances of the residuals are not 
uniform, cannot be ruled out. If the absolute magnitude of the residuals 
varies with the magnitude of the variables, both dependent and independent, 
heteroscedasticity is highly probable. It leads to still unbiased but inefficient 
estimators. Their variances are bigger than without heteroscedasticity. The 
sample of 29 monetary reforms is very heterogeneous as regards the 
                                             
9  Instead of this specification, one can think of applying a completely different 
approach, namely a binary choice model. The outcome of the reform process is not 
defined in terms of inflation but as a success (value 0) or a failure (value 1) of the 
monetary reform. Different to the OLS regression applied here (see blow), a logit or 
probit estimation would have to be applied in such a case. However, this approach 
has methodical shortcomings: for one, the outcome is not directly observable. 
Whether the reform is a success or not has to be decided by the researcher on the 
base of the observed inflation rates. One way to overcome this problem is to use an 
index function (Greene 1997, pp. 880f.). One has to choose a rate of inflation CPI* 
which distinguishes success from failure: y=1 if CPI>CPI*, and y=0 if CPI≤ CPI*. 
Furthermore, the binary choice approach is based on the assumption that the 
outcome of y (0 or 1) is due to the choices of the acting individual. Since we can take 
it for granted that the monetary policymaker would in any event choose success 
(value 0), we do not use this technique. In addition, the number of observations is too 
small to generate meaningful results of a logit or a probit estimation.  
10  For a general overview, see Kennedy (1992, in particular the synopsis on p. 45). 12 Andreas  Freytag 
 
magnitude of the variables. In some estimations heteroscedasticity occurred. 
White’s heteroscedasticity test and if necessary White’s correction for 
heteroscedasticity are applied. The interesting feature about White’s 
correction is that even in the presence of heteroscedasticity the OLS method 
can produce consistent estimators (White 1980). The computational task 
can be handled more easily than with a GLS estimation (Kennedy 1992, pp. 
118f).  
Other problems concern the stability and linearity of the parameters. It is 
assumed that the correlation between explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable is linear. This needs to be tested. We apply several 
stability tests to check whether the parameters are robust, e.g. the Ramsey-
reset test, the cusum of square-test and recursive residuals. Moreover, 
subsamples, are estimated separately, e.g. the Latin American countries. We 
also test whether it is critical to drop countries that do not perfectly 
correspond with the theory such as Germany 1990 and Hong Kong 1983. In 
both cases, hyperinflation was not the cause of the reform. As a general 
result, the parameters have proven robust in these tests. For the choice of 
the variables, we also calculate the correlation coefficient of the regressors. 
In general, it is low, the exception being the correlation of all factors with 
EF and EF2000. Their correlation with institutional factors and with each 
other is higher which is in line with theoretical reasoning.  
As a final assessment whether or not this diversity is problematic, we 
have made a cluster analysis (with SPSS 10.0), using the Ward method. A 
cluster analysis is not driven by theory; rather it aims at sorting out 
regularities and subgroups with similar properties within the sample. The 
results we obtain support the theoretical considerations and the empirical 
findings (see below). Regardless of the variables chosen, the clusters 
identified include either the majority of the worst failures or most of the 
greatest successes. Appendix 4 shows the results in more detail.  
c) Specification 1: showing the importance of commitment 
The first equation only considers the degree of commitment. In (8) 
institutions are neglected. It has the following shape:  
 
(8)   ε + + + + = PostBW ß SEIGN ß C ß ß ACPI 3 2 1 0 ln , 
where  ) , 0 ( ND ~
2
ε σ ε .  
 
Both ACPI (estimations 1 and 2) and WCPI (estimations 3 and 4) are 
tested. The results of different estimations are reported in Table 1. As for Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  13 
 
the goodness of fit, estimations 1 and 2 yield better results than estimations 
3 and 4. The average inflation rate is explained better by the model than a 
weighted average of inflation rates. Weighting always bears the danger of 
arbitrariness. Hence, in the specifications 2 and 3, we mainly use ACPI. 
Table 1: Estimators (Specification 1) 
Estimation 1 2 3  4 
Dependent  lnACPI lnACPI lnWCPI  lnWCPI 
Intercept  3.953*** 2.911*** 4.063*** 2.859*** 
Commitment    Cuw  -5.944***   -6.653***  
Commitment    Cw   -4.702***    -5.186*** 
Seigniorage     SEIGN  6.229*** 6.377*** 8.654*** 8.851*** 
Dummy            PostBW  2.353*** 2.677*** 2.807*** 3.164*** 
R² 0.758  0.763  0.694  0.693 
R²adj 0.729  0.735  0.653  0.656 
F-Stat. 26.12  26.87  18.88  18.8 
N 29  29  29  29 
*, **,***: significant at 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, 1 per cent level respectively; For 
an explanation of the variables see Appendices 1 and 2. 
Source: See Appendix 5. 
 
The first hypothesis of this paper about the determinants of the average 
inflation after monetary reforms cannot be rejected through estimations 1 
through 4. The index of commitment regardless of the chosen weighting 
(uw or w) and seigniorage show the expected sign and are significant on the 
1 per cent level. The higher the degree of commitment, the lower the 
average inflation. The politically optimal inflation is positively dependent 
on monetary seigniorage. Both independent variables have a great impact 
with that of SEIGN being higher.  
The sign of ß3, the coefficient for PostBW is positive. This evidence can 
be interpreted as follows: the Bretton-Woods system with its fixed 
exchange rate exerted a disciplinary pressure on governments, in particular 
in those countries with a fixed dollar exchange rate. Higher inflation than in 
the US regularly forced these countries to devalue their currency towards 
the US-$. This certainly had disciplinary effects. After 1973, the exchange 
rates became flexible. It also became easier to produce high inflation rates 
without the external anchor. The increasing capital mobility related to the 
post Bretton-Woods era has not become a similarly disciplining institution. 
Furthermore, the reform countries were subject to supply shocks after 1973. 
PostBW does not separate between these two effects. This dummy has a 
lower coefficient than commitment and seigniorage. 14 Andreas  Freytag 
 
d) Specification 2: institutions matter 
So far, we can conclude that commitment matters for the success of 
monetary reforms. The second hypothesis tests whether institutions also are 
relevant. Equation (9) adds institutional factors to the specifications 
independent variables. Alternatively, we substitute EF or EF2000 for the 
institutional factors. The estimation results of various forms of (14) are 
reported in Table2. 
 
(9)  
[] [ ] ε +
+ + + + =
T RC POI OP LM FS PS ß ß ß ß ß ß
PostBW ß SEIGN ß C ß ß ACPI
    2   73     2
ln
9 8 7 6 5 4
3 2 1 0
. 
Table 2: Estimators (Specification 2) 
Estimation  5 6 7 8  9 10 
Dependent  lnACPI lnACPI lnACPI lnACPI  lnACPI lnACPI 
Intercept 6.012***  6.335*** 6.428*** 6.79*** 7.616*** 7.183*** 
Cuw  -4.189*** -4.525***   -4.019** -3.088*   
Cw    -3.607***     -2.394* 
Institutions:         
        PS2  -0.992 -1.218*  -0.985      
       FS  -3.516** -4.273***  -3.595***      
       OP2  -5,91E-05        
       POI  -0.69        
       RC    -2.384**      
       EF     - 3 . 2 4 2 * *     
       EF2000       -4.476***  -4.43*** 
SEIGN  5.576*** 6.016*** 5.635*** 6.374*** 4.43***  4.567*** 
PostBW  2.343*** 2.314*** 1.785***      
R²  0.837 0.827 0.851 0.783  0.799 0.794 
R²adj  0.783 0.789 0.795 0.745  0.77  0.765 
F-Stat.  15.42 21.92 15.19 20.473  27.84 27.04 
N  29 29 23 21  25 25 
*, **,***: significant at 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, 1 per cent level respectively; For 
an explanation of the variables see Appendices 1 and 2. 
Source:: See Appendix 5. 
 
 
To incorporate all six institutional factors, does not make much sense. 
The degree of freedom would be too low. In addition, LM and LM73 are 
insignificant and do not have the predicted sign. In estimation 5, four 
institutional factors are regressed on inflation and have the predicted sign. 
Although only FS is individually significant, the institutional setting as a 
whole also is significant. This is the result of the Wald-Test. The null-
hypothesis of this test is that the factors PS2, FS, OP2 and POI have no Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  15 
 
joint influence on the dependent variable. This hypothesis can be rejected at 
the 1 per cent level of significance. Estimations 6 and 7 show that political 
stability, fiscal stability and properties of the reserve currency have the 
predicted sign. RC is also significant. The index of commitment, SEIGN 
and PostBW loose weight if institutional factors including EF and EF2000 
are added. As they are the most comprehensive proxies for institutions, the 
latter have the expected negative sign and are significant (estimations 8 
through 10). Following these estimations, economic freedom increases the 
political costs of inflation even more than a high degree of commitment. 
The tests of specification 2 are not likely to reject the hypothesis that 
institutions matter. Both the institutional factors and the degree of economic 
freedom exert a negative influence on the post-reform inflation. The results 
of estimations 6 and 7 are superior to those of estimations 8 through 10 
since the significance of commitment as well as the coefficient of 
determination R²adj are higher.  
e) Specification 3: ex-ante measure for credibility also relevant 
Still, (9) does not give evidence of the ex-ante credibility of monetary 
reforms. The impact of credibility is estimated in equation (10) and reported 
in Table 3. 
 
(10)    ε + + + − + = PostBW ß SEIGN ß IF C ß ß ACPI 3 2
2
1 0 ) ) /( 1 ( ln , 
where: 
n
IF
IF
n
i
n ∑
= = 1 . 
 
The squared difference between commitment and the average outcome of 
the institutional factors emphasises great differences and diminishes small 
differences. Unless marked otherwise, the institutional factors are used in 
the following specifications: PS1,  FS,  LM73,  OP1,  POI. The estimation 
results are reported in Table 3. It turns out that the proxy for credibility 
based on the weighted index of commitment (estimations 13 and 14) has a 
more significant impact on inflation than the one based on the unweighted 
index (estimations 11 and 12). The significance level and the coefficient of 
determination are higher in the latter case. The higher the ex-ante credibility 
of a monetary reform, the lower the politically optimal inflation rate. 
However, the coefficient of credibility adds little to R²adj. Notwithstanding 
this result, we conclude that the theoretical considerations cannot be 
rejected on the grounds of these estimations. 16 Andreas  Freytag 
 
Table 3: Estimators (Variant 3) 
Estimation 11
1 12
2 13  14 
Dependent  lnACPI lnWCPI  lnACPI  lnWCPI 
Intercept  0.05 0.472 0.543 0.239 
Credibility       1/(Cuw-IF)²  -6.69E-05 -2.98E-06     
Credibility       1/(Cw-IF)²     -7.34E-06***  9.63E-06*** 
SEIGN  13.207*** 10.893*** 8.655*** 11.439** 
PostBW  2.901*** 2.577*** 2.43***  2.921*** 
R² 0.569  0.537  0.605  0.594 
R²adj 0.528  0.482  0.557  0.545 
F-Stat. 11.02  9.777  12.74  12.185 
N 29  29  29  29 
1: LM instead of LM73 used in 1/(Cuw-IF)²; ²: no use of LM or LM73 in 1/(Cuw-IF)². 
*, **,***: significant at 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, 1 per cent level respectively; For 
an explanation of the variables see Appendix 1 and 2.  
Source: See Appendix 5. 
 
The significance of the proxy of credibility is very sensitive with respect 
to the specification of a) the degree of commitment and of b) the 
institutional setting, IF. In all estimations, R²adj is smaller than in both 
specification 1 and 2. The magnitude of the influence of credibility on 
inflation is small as compared to the influence of commitment alone. 
 
V.  Discussion of the Results 
The econometric analysis confirms the theoretical considerations about 
the determinants of the post-reform inflation rates. The most important 
independent variable is monetary commitment (C). It has a great impact on 
the post reform inflation rate: its ß-value indicates that an increase in 
commitment leads to relatively decreasing inflation. Hence, the design of 
the monetary regime surely matters for the success of the reform.  
A very relevant explanatory variable is SEIGN. This variable has proven 
significant regardless of the specification. This upshot is not new, rather, it 
can be regarded as being another confirmation of the generally accepted 
insight that solving fiscal problems via money growth causes inflation. The 
strict separation of fiscal and monetary policy is certainly one important 
prerequisite for the success of a monetary reform. In many (successful) 
instances of the sample, the outcome of the variable changes considerably 
after the monetary reform. For instance, Argentina reduced its reliance on 
money growth from a value of SEIGN of 0.5 prior to 1991 to a value of 
0.01 a few years later. Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  17 
 
Another regressor of crucial importance is PostBW. The probability of a 
monetary reform to fail rises dramatically in the aftermath of supply shocks 
and without the disciplining structure of the Bretton-Woods system. The 
international attitude towards inflation influences the policymakers’ 
decision to create stability. This does not necessarily mean that freedom of 
capital transactions which started after the end of Bretton-Woods does not 
discipline governments as well. However, since the sample contains 
countries with very bad monetary performance, the highly significant 
positive correlation makes sense economically. This is also very interesting 
from the policymaker’s point of view. For international monetary discipline 
or international agreement can increase the probability of a success of 
reforms. Monetary reformers can for instance make use of the scapegoat 
function of international organisations (Vaubel 1986). 
With the exception of the proxy for labour market flexibility, the 
institutional factors contribute to the explanation of the politically optimal 
inflation. However, the strength and significance of their contribution are 
remarkably lower than those of commitment, seigniorage and international 
discipline. Nevertheless, openness of the country, political stability, public 
opposition to inflation and a properly chosen reserve currency can 
contribute to a low post-reform inflation rate. Fiscal stability is a significant 
determinant of low post-reform inflation. The other exception is EF, the 
index of economic freedom. It has a strong and significant negative impact 
on the politically optimal inflation.  
The ambiguous performance of institutional factors can have two 
explanations. The first explanation is that the institutional setting may not 
seem important economically: if this is true, the organisation of the 
monetary regime itself (C) is much more relevant for the success of the 
reform although institutions are restrictions for the monetary policy. 
Moreover, one basic restriction is covered by SEIGN. This would mean that 
fiscal stability as defined in Appendix 2 is not relevant. However, SEIGN is 
not correlated with the institutional factors, in particular with fiscal 
stability.
11 Thus, we regard this explanation as being misleading.  
The second and more plausible explanation for the rather low 
significance is that the composition of the variables for institutional factors 
(except for the index of economic freedom) suffers from the data 
shortcomings and the diversity of the sample. The cluster analysis 
strengthens this argument. Especially labour market flexibility is a case in 
point. It has been turned out to be impossible to compose a proper indicator. 
                                             
11  The correlation between SEIGN and FS1 is 0.1556.  18 Andreas  Freytag 
 
The finally chosen gross shift in per cent of the work force is calculated for 
the same period for all reform countries and does not take into consideration 
the individual point in time of each monetary reform.  
Finally, the proxy for credibility can add to the explanation of post-
reform inflation. Nevertheless, it is a very sensitive variable; changing the 
weights in C can even lead to a changing sign of the parameter.
12 Therefore, 
to be definitely seen as a reliable ex-ante measure of credibility, it has to be 
based on better data. Nevertheless, the result shows how credibility can be 
applied as a ex-ante concept in a post-reform model. 
 
VI. Policy  Conclusions 
This paper has shown the causes of success and failure of monetary 
reforms in a positive analysis. The main objective of such an analysis is to 
generate potentially successful reform options for a country suffering from 
severe inflation. Needless to say that for a precise and credible reform 
recommendation, it is necessary to also consider detailed institutional 
circumstances of the country which cannot be adequately covered by the 
institutional factors defined in this study, even if superior data was 
available. The situation in reality is considerably more complex than 
suggested by any model. Notwithstanding, the econometric analysis clearly 
marks the central requirements of monetary reforms. Therefore, the 
econometric model presented here can be supportive for deeper analysis of 
the economic situation in a potential reform country. 
As regards policy conclusions, three elements are crucial for a monetary 
reform to be successful: first, a strong commitment to stability in the legal 
monetary regime established by the government can prevent the monetary 
policymaker from inflating. Second, institutional factors certainly restrict 
the government’s choice of an appropriate monetary regime. Monetary 
policy is only one part of the economic order. The interdependence of its 
elements has to be considered. Third, a monetary reform undoubtedly fails 
if the government is unable to generate revenues from other sources than the 
money press. To answer the question raised in the paper’s title, first and 
foremost these three factors distinguish successes from failures. 
                                             
12  This is the result of alternative estimations with other weights in C. Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  19 
 
Appendix 1: The Index of Commitment 
 
To measure the degree of commitment, an index of commitment has been 
constructed along the lines of an index of central bank independence 
(Cukierman 1992). It is the (unweighted and weighted, Table A1) average 
of 10 criteria which characterise the monetary regime. Table A2 shows the 
codings in detail.  
 
•  Various  objectives of monetary policy can be thought of, e.g. price 
stability, employment, external equilibrium etc.  
•  The higher the constitutional level where the monetary regime is laid 
down, the higher the commitment. 
•  The lower the discretionary power left to the government, the higher the 
degree of commitment. 
•  External obligations, like an external anchor or contingent help by the 
IMF or other IOs, also raise commitment. 
•  The  appointment and dismissal procedures of monetary policymakers 
have influence on the degree of commitment. 
•  Limitations on lending to the government are important for the degree of 
commitment. If lending is allowed, commitment is low.  
•  Convertibility restrictions also diminish the degree of commitment.  
•  Competitive elements in the monetary regime indicate a high degree of 
commitment.  
•  Regulatory issues exert ambiguous influence of the degree of 
commitment.  
•  The same holds for the accountability of the monetary authorities.  
 
Table A1: Weights given to the components  
Criterion Component  unweigthed  (Cuw) weighted  (Cw) 
1.  Objectives  Obj  0.10 0.15 
2.  Constitutional level Const  0.10 0.05 
3.  Discretionary power  Gov  0.10 0.15 
4.  External obligations  Extern  0.10 0.15 
5.  Appointment/dismissal       Ceo  0.05 0.025 
     procedures       Diss  0.05 0.025 
6.  Limitations on lending  Lim  0.10 0.20 
7.  Convertibility restrictions       Conv  0.05 0.10 
       Mult  0.05 0.05 
8.  Competitive elements  Comp  0.10 0.05 
9.  Regulatory issues  Reg  0.10 0.025 
10. Accountability  Acc  0.10 0.025 
Sum    1.00 1.00 20 Andreas  Freytag 
 
Table A2: Codings of the Index of commitment 
Criterion Com-
ponent 
Explanation   Numerical 
codings 
Objectives of monetary policy  obj  1. Price stability only goal  1.00 
    2. Other objectives mentioned  0.50 
    3. No goals for monetary policy  0.00 
      
Level where monetary regime is  const 1.  Constitution  1.00 
established    2. Central bank law  0.66 
   3.  Decree  0.33 
    4. Not fixed at all  0.00 
      
Discretionary power left to the   gov  1. No power left to the government  1.00 
government    2. Exchange rate consulted between    
        government and monetary   
         authority  0.66 
    3. Exchange rate regime completely   
        left to government  0.33 
    4. Government may override monetary   
        authority as regards monetary policy  0.00 
      
External pledge of the  extern  1. Exchange rate fixed to a hard   
government        currency and money base fully   
        backed with foreign reserves  1.00 
    2. Exchange rate fixed  0.75 
    3. Crawling peg  0.50 
    4. Conditional help accepted  0.25 
    5. No external pledge  0.00 
      
Conditions of appointment and   ceo  1. CEO must be a reputed expert  1.00 
dismissal of monetary CEO    2. No expertise demanded  0.00 
      
  diss  1. Appointment with fixed term and    
        dismissal only after bad performance  1.00 
    2. No rules for dismissal  0.50 
    3. Dismissal unconditioned or linked to   
        resignation of governments and    
        single politicians  0.00 
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Criterion Com-
ponent 
Explanation   Numerical 
codings 
Limitations on lending to the   lim  1. Monetary authority is prohibited    
Government        to give credit to the public  1.00 
    2. Monetary authority is allowed to   
        purchase public bonds in hard    
        currency on the secondary market  0.66 
    3. Monetary authority is allowed to pur-   
        chase public bonds in any currency   
        on the secondary market and to give   
        limited credit to the government  0.33 
    4. No limitations on lending to the   
        government  0.00 
      
Convertibility restrictions  conv  1. Full convertibility  1.00 
    2. Partial convertibility  0.75 
    3. Convertibility for current   
        account transactions only  0.50 
    4. Convertibility for capital   
        account transactions only  0.25 
    5. No convertibility  0.00 
      
  mult  1. One exchange rate  1.00 
    2. Multiple exchange rate  0.00 
      
Competitive elements in the   comp  1. A hard currency can be used for   
monetary regime        all transactions  1.00 
    2. A hard currency can be used for    
        some transactions, others excluded  0.66 
    3. A hard currency may be held  0.33 
    4. No holdings or transactions in    
        hard currencies allowed  0.00 
      
Financial market regulation  reg  1. Financial market regulation is    
        assigned to a separated bureau  1.00 
    2. Financial market regulation is    
        assigned to monetary authority  0.50 
    3. No financial market regulation  0.00 
      
Accountability of the monetary   acc  1. Obligation to inform the public   
authority        on a regular basis  1.00 
    2. Obligation to inform the    
        parliament in public hearings  0.66 
    3 Obligation to inform the   
        government without publicity 0.33 
    4. No accountability  0.00 
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Appendix 2: Other Variables 
Institutional Factors 
 
Political stability (PS) in this context means a political system is stable 
rather than long-term survival of a government. The variables PS1 and PS2 
are composed of three elements: unsuccessful irregular executive transfers 
(coup d’état,  UIET), successful irregular executive transfers (SEIT) and 
political reprisals in the year of monetary reform (REPRIS). The latter is a 
dummy, its outcome being 0 or 1, depending on whether or not political 
reprisal exists. UIET and SEIT are the numbers of coups in the 25 years 
before the monetary reform. The time span of 25 years has been chosen as 
this can be more or less be defined as being one generation and is therefore 
memorable for the public. For both indicators holds:  1 2 , 1 0 ≤ ≤ PS PS . 
 
  REPRIS SIET UIET PS 5 , 0 ) 6 , 0 4 , 0 1 ( 5 , 0 1
2 + − − = . 
 
REPRIS SIET UIET PS 5 , 0 ) 6 , 0 4 , 0 1 ( 5 , 0 2 + − − = . 
 
An indicator of fiscal stability (FS) should meet two conditions. Ideally, it 
should not be based exclusively on historical performance, and it should 
also be possible to calculate it at the moment of the monetary reform. We 
choose a mix of past and future data; s stands for time and t denotes the 
year of the reform. The indicator is derived from the fiscal balance (FB = 
revenues minus expenditure) of the state which is divided by the GDP: 
 
 
2
1 / 8 / 1
5
2
+ ∑
=
+
− =
t
t s
s s GDP FB
FS , where s denotes time. 
 
Labour market flexibility (LM) depends on many factors, the most 
important being the regulation of the market. The regulation in the countries 
in the sample is very patchy. To compare the labour market regime over 
both such a time horizon as well as so many countries in our sample is 
complicated. Thus, instead of analysing labour market regimes, we look at 
the actual flexibility of the labour force which may be affected by several 
factors, among others the labour market regime, but also technological 
change and the state of development a country is in. Our indicator of labour 
market flexibility, therefore, is rather simple. It is the gross shift in per cent 
of the work force among the three sectors Agriculture, Industry and 
Services between 1950 and 1977 which is divided by 66 (the maximum 
gross shift in 121 countries, Taylor and Jodice 1983a, pp. 257-259). LM is 
restricted between 0 and 1.  Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  23 
 
 
  66 / s GrossShift LM =  
 
One property of LM is that its outcome for advanced countries is lower than 
for less developed countries. Industrialised countries had already 
experienced a great deal of structural change from agriculture to industry 
and to services in 1977 when the time span covered by LM ends. Structural 
change proceeded more rapidly in developed countries than in developing 
countries until the 1960s. Thereafter it slows down. We have chosen the 
year 1973 as a benchmark year. A way to improve the empirical content of 
LM is to adjust it to this difference in structural change. LM73 is defined as 
follows: 
 
 
1973
1973
     
   
* 66 / 73
US Capita per GDP
Capita per GDP
s GrossShift LM =  
 
We restrict the indicator for openness, OP, to trade (EX+IM). We define a 
country with 2,000 US-$ trade per capita per year as completely open and 
again set every value above 1 equal to 1. 
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The remaining indicator is not restricted between 0 and 1.  
 
  ∑ + =
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Public opposition to inflation (POI) is made up of past experience and 
actual regulations. The former inflation record is especially relevant for a 
country after a hyperinflation. People are very sensitive as regards stability: 
since they know the cost of inflation on average they are strongly opposing 
another hyperinflation. Again, the time horizon is 25 years before the 
reforms, roughly a generation. One part of the indicator is the number of 
years with an inflation rate of at least 100 per cent p.a. (H), divided by 
25.The other elements are dummies for the absence of repressed inflation 24 Andreas  Freytag 
 
(REPIN), that is prices are at least partly fixed
13, and indexation of wages, 
taxes, government bonds etc. (INDEX): 
 
  3 / )) 1 (
25
( INDEX REPIN
H
POI − + + = . 
 
To measure how appropriate the reserve currency is, we calculate the 
institutional factor properties of reserve currency (RC). It is composed of 
two elements: first, the number of foreign countries fixing the exchange rate 
towards the same reserve currency, is calculated by taking those five 
countries apart from the reserve country with which trade is most intense: if 
all five are pegged to the reserve currency, RCer is one, with four currencies 
being pegged, RCer is 0.8 and so on. The measure of the trade share RCt is 
simply defined by the quotient of bilateral trade between the reform country 
and the reserve country and the reform country’s total international trade.  
 
  2 / ) ( t er RC RC RC + = . 
 
As an alternative to the application of a combination of five institutional 
factors, in what follows we introduce a comprehensive index, the index of 
economic freedom by Gwartney and Lawson (1997, p.4). Their index 
consists of 17 components, separated into four groups. These groups are: 
 
1. Money and inflation, 4 components, weight: 15.7 per cent (omitted). 
2. Government operations and regulations, 6 components, 34.6 per cent. 
3. Takings and discriminatory taxation, 3 components, 27.2 per cent. 
4. Restraints on International Exchange, 4 components, 22.5 per cent. 
 
Since the first group (money and inflation) is the subject of our analysis, we 
eliminate it from the index, but use the results that Gwartney and Lawson 
reached in their study. In case there is no result for the year of the reform, 
we take the next one available after the reform result. The reason for this is 
the assumption that the change in the overall economic system coincides 
with the monetary reform.  
 
 
10 * 843 . 0
) 225 . 0 * 4 272 . 0 * 3 346 . 0 * 2 ( GL G G G
EF
+ +
= . 
 
Similarly,  EF2000 is calculated as the weighted average of five groups 
(except for monetary policy and alternative currencies) of the 2000 index of 
                                             
13  This definition explicitly includes the fixing of prices of food, utilities etc. for an 
urban population which is usual in many Latin American countries. Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  25 
 
economic freedom by Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000, p. 7) which is 
composed of 23 components in seven groups: 
 
1.  Size of government, 2 components, 11 per cent. 
2.  Structure of the economy and the use of markets, 4 components, 14.2 
per cent. 
3. Monetary policy and price stability, 3 components, 9.2 per cent 
(omitted). 
4. Freedom to use alternative currencies, 2 components, 14.6 per cent 
(omitted). 
5.  Legal structure and property rights, 3 components, 16.6 per cent 
6.  International exchange: trade, 5 components, 17.1 per cent 
7.  Freedom to exchange in capital and financial markets, 4 components, 
17.2 per cent. 
 
10 * 762 . 0
) 172 . 0 * 7 171 . 0 * 6 166 . 0 * 5 142 . 0 * 2 11 . 0 * 1 (
2000 GLS G G G G G
EF
+ + + +
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Other Exogenous Variables 
 
The other exogenous variables are explained in section III. SEIGN is the 
average of seigniorage in five years after the reform, M denotes the money 
base, R stands for revenues. 
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   0 = PostBW , if  1973 ≤ t , and  1 = PostBW , if  1973 > t . 
 
The Dependent Variable  
 
Inflation is calculated in two ways. First, the annual rates of consumer price 
inflations are differently weighted (WCPI). An average inflation considering 
the disinflation process is calculated. Later periods are given higher 
weights. Second, we calculate an average inflation rate of the five years 
after the reform.  
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Appendix 3: The Sample of 29 Monetary Reforms 
Table A3: Pre-Reform Inflation, Monetary Regimes and the Degree of 
Commitment in the Sample  
Countries Year  CPI  in 
t-1 
Monetary 
Regime 
Cuw C
w 
Pi in t 
o t+5 
1) Argentina  1991 2,313.7  Currency  Board  0.798  0.873  8.3* 
2) Argentina  1985 549.4  CB
1, fixed ER  0.462  0.462  577.6 
3) Bolivia  1987  277.0  CB, fixed ER  0.540  0.466  16.3* 
4) Bolivia  1963  5.9  CB, fixed ER  0.540  0.466  7.3* 
5) Brazil  1994  1,000.0  CB, fixed ER  0.495  0.482  113.8 
6) Brazil  1989  1,431.7  CB, flexible ER  0.238  0.188  736.9 
7) Brazil  1986  226.1  CB, fixed ER  0.346  0.317  1,310.7 
8) Chile  1975 511.1².  CB, fixed ER  0.474  0.350  78.6 
9) Estonia  1992 1,069.0² Currency  Board  0.787 0.837  37.6* 
10) Germany  1990  n.a.  CB, flexible ER  0.665  0.649  3.5* 
11) Germany  1948  25.4  CB, fixed ER  0.707  0.712  1.0* 
12) Greece  1954  9.1  CB, flexible ER  0.424  0.312  3.1* 
13) Hong Kong  1983 10.1² Currency  Board  0.674 0.804  5.8* 
14) Israel  1985  374.9  CB, fixed ER  0.503  0.478  23.8* 
15) Israel  1980  75.0  CB, flexible ER  0.495  0.411  196.5 
16) Korea  1962  12.1  CB, fixed ER  0.441  0.308  18.9* 
17) Latvia  1992 243.6²  CB, flexible ER  0.632  0.628  35.2* 
18) Lithuania  1994 409.7² Currency  Board  0.715 0.829  27.9* 
19) Mexico  1993  15.5  CB, fixed ER  0.628  0.641  22.1* 
20) Mexico  1987  87.3  CB, fixed ER  0.378  0.291  35.8 
21) Nicaragua  1990/91  7,475,8  CB, fixed ER  0.662  0.649  14.5* 
22) Nicaragua  1988  911,5  CB, fixed ER  0.441  0.358  1,009.2 
23) Peru  1991  7,592.3  CB, flexible ER  0.578  0.624  31.7* 
24) Peru  1985  110,5  CB, fixed ER  0.445  0.383  823.3 
25) Russia  1994  874.6  CB, fixed ER  0.611  0.632  59.2 
26) Slovenia  1991  n.a.  CB, flexible ER  0.511  0.507  18.2* 
27) Ukraine  1992  n.a.  CB, fixed ER  0.187  0.266  215.2 
28) Uruguay  1993  68.4  CB, fixed ER  0.457  0.425  28.5* 
29) Uruguay  1975  77.3  CB, fixed ER  0.440  0.391  56.5 
1: CB = central bank, ER = exchange rate; ²: CPI in t.; * if av. CPI < 50 per cent, the 
reform is assessed as being a success for the cluster analysis (see also footnote 9 and 
Appendix 4). 
Source: See Appendix 5. 
 
The sample does not contain former socialist countries introducing a new 
monetary regime during the transformation process. After a failure of the 
new regime in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Russia and the Ukraine, 
a monetary reform as defined here become necessary in these countries. 
Those reforms are considered in the sample.  Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  27 
 
Appendix 4: Some Features of the Cluster Analysis 
 
The following Table A4 shows the most relevant and interesting clusters 
depending on the variables chosen for the cluster analysis. The numbers in 
the groups refer to cases introduced in Table A3, first column. We have 
used the Ward method since it assigns the cases more precisely to the 
‘correct’ groups than other methods (Backhaus et al. 1994). One condition 
for the goodness of the analysis is that the variables are not highly 
correlated. Therefore, the clusters based on EF or EF2000 (highly 
correlated with the institutional factors) are less easily distinguished.  
 
Table A4: Results of the Cluster Analysis 
Variables  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
SEIGN, 
ACPI 
1, 8, 3, 23, 12, 18, 
14, 26, 28, 10, 11, 
20, 5, 21, 17, 15, 
27 
(mainly successes, 
14 out of 17) 
7, 29, 9, 19, 4, 
16, 6, 25, 13 
(mixed evidence) 
2, 24, 22  
(only failures) 
no  
SEIGN, 
ACPI, Cuw, 
(C-IF)² 
all other cases  2, 22, 24 
(only failures) 
 no 
Cuw, (C-IF)²  all other cases 
 
10, 29  
(mixed evidence) 
22, 24, 2 
(only failures) 
no 
SEIGN, 
ACPI, Cw  
10, 21, 17, 20, 11, 
23, 14, 26, 5, 28, 
15, 3, 4, 25, 1, 9, 
18, 13 
(mainly successes, 
15 out of 18) 
7, 29, 16, 19, 12, 
6, 27, 8 
(mixed evidence) 
2, 24, 22 
(only failures) 
no 
SEIGN, 
ACPI,  Cw, 
PS1,  OP2, 
LM73,  FS, 
POI 
11, 17, 9, 12, 15, 
14, 13, 19, 20, 18, 
(mainly successes, 
9 out of 10) 
10, 26, 3, 16, 7, 
1, 25, 27  
(mixed evidence) 
2, 24, 22 
(only failures) 
28, 29, 6, 8, 4, 
21, 23, 5 
(mixed evidence) 
ACPI, Cuw, 
(C-IF)², 
PS2,  FS, 
POI,  OP1, 
LM73  
9, 18, 11, 14, 27, 
17, 25, 12, 13, 15 
(mainly successes, 
7 out of 10) 
1, 26, 3, 16, 7, 
28, 29, 10  
(mixed evidence) 
22, 24, 8, 21, 4, 
23, 5, 6, 19, 20, 
2 (mainly 
failures, 6 out 
of 11) 
no 
PS2,  FS, 
POI,  OP1, 
LM73 
10, 26, 9, 16, 4, 
12, 17, 25, 11, 15 
(only 1 from Latin 
America) 
2, 19, 1, 21, 24, 
3, 7, 29, 8, 23  
(all from Latin 
America) 
18, 28, 20  
(mixed 
evidence) 
5, 6, 22, 27, 14 
(mixed evidence)
1 
1: Hong Kong forms a fifth group.  
Source: See Appendix 5 28 Andreas  Freytag 
 
Appendix 5: Data Sources 
 
To begin with, the index of commitment C consists of ten components. An 
important source for these components is the central bank law of the 
respective country, particularly for details about internal relations between 
central bank and government. Many central bank laws today are available 
on the internet. A collection of central bank homepages is given by Mark 
Bernkopf (http://.adams.patriot.net/∼ bernkopf/banks-nf.html). A list of 
central bank laws and directives can also be found at the New York 
University (www.law.nyu.edu/centralbankscenter/texts/order.html). Both 
homepages are very useful. To complete the list, we draw upon the library 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt/Main. Central bank laws are also 
reprinted in Aufricht (1962). Some central bank laws and further 
information (Israel, Slovenia, Hong Kong, Ukraine) have been sent to the 
author upon request. A valuable source, especially for external monetary 
relations of countries as well as for monetary history, is Picks Currency 
Yearbook and its successor, the World Currency Yearbook, edited by Philip 
Cowitt. They were published between 1955 and 1989. External features can 
also been found in IMF (d). Beside this collection, many papers and books 
are valuable. Among them, we particularly make use of Bähr (1994), 
Bennett (1993 and 1994), Buch (1993), Cukierman (1992, pp. 371-411), 
(Fischer 1986), Fischer, Hiemenz and Trapp (1985), Greenwood (1983), 
Mastroberardino (1994, pp. 161-171 and 187-197), and Schuler (1996).  
For the computation of institutional factors, a number of sources are used. 
Before we describe the sources by variables, one remark about the German 
monetary reform in 1948, the eldest reform in the sample, is due. For some 
of the independent variables, different issues of Statistisches Bundesamt (a) 
and SVR (1966) are consulted. In general, the following sources are used. 
The indicators of political stability PS1 and PS2 are based on the following 
sources. Indicators of coup d’etats (SEIT and UIET) are taken from Taylor 
and Jodice (1983b, pp. 89-94). They report irregular transfers until 1977. 
For the period from 1978 through 1994 The Economist was consulted to 
collect information about coup d`etats. The same holds for the component 
REPRIS: on the basis of reading old issues, we decided whether to assign a 
1 or a 0. The variable for fiscal stability (FS) is mainly based on IMF (a)¸ 
IMF (b) and IMF (c). Only the data for Hong Kong and Korea are based 
upon national statistics which have been sent to the author. Labour market 
flexibility is calculated following Taylor and Jodice (1983a, pp. 257-259). 
For the calculation of LM73 we a use IMF data in addition. The indicators 
of openness (OP1 and OP2) are based upon the United Nations Yearbook 
of International Trade Statistics. Additionally, IMF (a), IMF (b) and (c) are 
used. For the calculation of the indicator of Public opposition to inflation 
POI we employ IMF (c) data for the component H. REPIN is based on back Success and Failure of Monetary Reforms  29 
 
issues of The Economist, and for INDEX we refer to Fischer (1983) as well 
as Bruno and Piterman (1990) and Corbo and Solimano (1991). Properties 
of reserve currencies RC are computed with the help of data data from the 
United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics and Statistisches 
Bundesamt (1994a and 1994b). Finally, the index of economic freedom EF 
and EF2000 are modified versions of the index composed by Gwartney and 
Lawson (1997) and by Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000) respectively.  
The calculation of the other independent variables, in particular the 
influence of seigniorage SEIGN is purely based on IMF (a through c) data. 
The same holds for the dependent variable consumer price inflation (WCPI, 
ACPI).  
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